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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
 David Andrews was found not guilty of the crimes for 
which he was charged.  He brought suit against Officer 
Robert Sciulli for false arrest and malicious prosecution.1  On 
                                              
1 We note that Officer Sciulli’s name is spelled “Scuilli” in 
various places throughout the record, in our Court’s caption, 
and in that of the District Court.  Nonetheless, it is apparent 
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appeal he contends that the District Court erred by granting 
summary judgment, on the basis of qualified immunity, in 
favor of Sciulli.  We agree.  We will reverse the District 
Court’s judgment and remand the cause for trial. 
 
II. 
 On November 25, 2012 in Stowe Township, Pa, 
Brooke Wagner was walking on a sidewalk from a friend’s 
house to her home.  She was fifteen years old.  A man in a car 
approached her and asked if she wanted a ride.  She told him 
“no.”  He demanded that she get in the car.  Wagner again 
refused and told him that she would report him to the police.  
He sped away.  She used her mobile phone to call her mother, 
who told her to go home.  The mother then called the police. 
 
 Both Officer Sciulli and Officer Antonio Reymundo 
Ruiz of the Stowe Township Police Department arrived at 
Wagner’s home within minutes of the mother’s report.  Upon 
questioning by Ruiz, Wagner described the vehicle as a red, 
four-door sedan.  She said that the car had a Pennsylvania 
license plate bearing the letters ACG.  She described the 
driver as a white male with dark hair, around 35 years old.  
Ruiz gave this information to Sciulli, who then went to the 
location of the incident.  Sciulli prepared an Incident 
Investigation Report that same day, recording the details 
Wagner had provided. 
 
                                                                                                     
from his police reports that the correct spelling of Appellee’s 
name is “Sciulli,” Appx 130, 145, and we will use that 
spelling in our opinion.   
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 The next day, the mother was driving Wagner home 
from a grocery store when Wagner saw a red car.  She told 
her mother that it was the car that had stopped next to her the 
day before.  She noted that the license number was JDG4817.  
They followed the car until it stopped in a parking lot.  Her 
mother drove into the lot and parked.  Wagner observed the 
driver get out and walk into a building.  She believed he was 
the man that tried to lure her into the car on the day before. 
 
 Wagner’s mother then drove her directly to the police 
station.  They met with Sciulli and Officer Gruber.2  Wagner 
reported what she observed:  the red car, the full license 
number, and the driver.  She also stated her conclusion that 
this was the car and man she encountered the previous day.  
The officers checked the license number, JDG4817, in the 
JNET database and identified the car as belonging to David 
Andrews.  They obtained Andrews’ license photo and created 
a photo array with images of Andrews and seven other men.3  
Sciulli presented the lineup to Wagner and instructed her to 
circle the picture of anyone she recognized.  Wagner circled 
the image of Andrews. 
 After Wagner and her mother left the station, Sciulli 
went to the parking lot they said was the location of Andrews’ 
                                              
2 The record does not provide Officer Gruber’s full name. 
 
3 There is a discrepancy on whether Gruber, or both Gruber 
and Sciulli prepared the photo lineup.  We do not regard this 
as material to the matter, and merely note the dispute. 
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car and he looked at the vehicle.4  Andrews’ automobile was 
not a four-door sedan, but a red, three-door coupe.5 
 
 Sciulli drafted an affidavit of probable cause to arrest 
Andrews.  The affidavit, dated November 28, 2012, stated:  
 
Officers were notified on 
11/25/12 at approximately 1112 
hours, of a possible child luring 
                                              
4 We discuss the sequence of Sciulli’s observation of the car 
and his writing the probable cause affidavit in greater detail 
later in the opinion.  See infra pp 11-13. 
 
5The District Court refers to Andrews’ car as a “three-door 
hatchback.”  Andrews v. Sciulli, No. CIV.A. 13-1357, 2015 
WL 5732101, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2015).  However, the 
record shows that Andrews’ car was a 2001 Saturn SC.  
Appx. 240.  Andrews described this car as a coupe style (as 
opposed to a sedan) with one door on the passenger side.  On, 
the driver’s side, there is a full door and a small rear-hinged 
door.  The small door aided access to the backseat.  There is 
no mention of a hatchback door or lid in the rear of the car 
anywhere in the record.  Sciulli did not raise this detail at the 
District Court and admitted in deposition that he knew the car 
was not a four-door sedan, as Wagner described.  Therefore, 
the District Court’s seeming error in characterizing the car as 
a “hatchback” is of no real consequence.  Nonetheless, we 
will refer to Andrews’ car as a “three-door coupe” to 
distinguish it from the “four-door sedan” that Wagner 
described. 
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incident.  I, officer Sciulli, and 
officer Ruiz were dispatched to 
1309 Island Avenue to meet the 
victim.  At this time, officers 
spoke with the victim.  The 
female juvenile’s information was 
obtained and is on  record and 
said juvenile and parent will be 
present at all court hearings. 
 
The victim (female juvenile age 
15) stated that while walking 
home from a friend’s house, a red 
vehicle pulled up next to her 
while walking on the sidewalk 
and asked her (juvenile age 15) if 
she wanted a ride.  The victim 
stated “NO”.  The defendant then 
said “COME ON, JUST GET 
IN”.  The victim then said “NO, 
I’M FINE.  Now I am going to 
report you”.  The victim then 
stated that the vehicle sped away. 
 
The victim then described this 
male as a middle aged white male 
with dark hair with streaks of 
gray.  Victim described the 
vehicle as a red 4 door sedan. 
 
On 11/26/12, the victim spotted 
this same vehicle described 
above, driving on Island Avenue, 
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while riding with her mother.  She 
identified the plate as JDG4817, 
PA tag.  They followed the 
vehicle to Axion, and victim again 
positively identified the male 
driver as the suspect she 
encountered the previous day. 
 
The victim and her mother came 
to the station to give officers this 
information.  Officers ran the PA 
plate, JDG4817, and found it to be 
registered to David Gene 
Andrews, out of Beaver Falls, PA.  
Based on this information, 
officers created a line up using 
similar identifiers as Andrews. 
 
The victim was shown a line up, 
created by myself and officer 
Gruber, generated by descriptors 
through J-NET[sic].  The victim 
was asked to look at the pictures 
and to see if there was anyone of 
the pictures that she recognized as 
the driver of the car.  She was 
advised that he might or might not 
be in the pictures.  The victim 
looked at the pictures and almost 
immediately picked out the 
picture of defendant.  The 
defendant was identified through 
JNET Pa. drivers [sic] license as 
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David Gene Andrews, DOB 
[REDACTED]. 
 
Your affiant respectfully requests 
that a warrant be issued for David 
Gene Andrews based on the facts 
enumerated above. 
 
Appx. 245.6 
 The magisterial district judge reviewed the affidavit 
and issued the arrest warrant on November 28, 2012.  That 
same day, police arrested Andrews and charged him with 
luring a child into a motor vehicle, stalking, corruption of a 
minor, and harassment.  In a bench trial, he was acquitted of 
all charges in June 2013.  Andrews filed this lawsuit on 
November 20, 2013.  The District Court granted Sciulli’s 
motion for summary judgment on September 30, 2015.  This 
appeal followed. 
 
III. 
A. 
                                              
6 The affidavit refers to “Axion.”  This location is referenced 
as “Axiom” in other places in the record.  See e.g. Appx. 150.  
The record does not ground a conclusion on the correct 
spelling, so we merely note the difference and leave the 
affidavit as is. 
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 We review de novo the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment.  Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 
497, 505 (3d Cir. 2003).7  Summary judgment is appropriate 
when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed 
R. Civ. P. 56(a).  When we review the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment, we will reverse only in those instances 
when we conclude that material facts are in dispute, or when 
we determine that the undisputed facts—viewed in a light 
most favorable to the non-moving party—could objectively 
support a jury’s verdict in favor of the non-moving party.  
Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
 Andrews raises claims of false arrest and malicious 
prosecution against Sciulli.  To assess claims of false arrest, 
the court must determine whether “the arresting officers had 
probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed 
the offense.”  Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 
141 (3d Cir. 1988).  Malicious prosecution requires evidence 
that: 
 
(1) the defendant[] initiated a 
criminal proceeding; (2) the 
criminal proceeding ended in the 
plaintiff’s favor; (3) the 
proceeding was initiated without 
probable cause; (4) the 
defendant[] acted maliciously or 
for a purpose other than bringing 
                                              
7 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291.  
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the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the 
plaintiff suffered a deprivation of 
liberty consistent with the concept 
of seizure as a consequence of a 
legal proceeding. 
 
DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 601 (3d 
Cir.2005). 
 
 However, Sciulli contended at summary judgment that 
he has qualified immunity from this lawsuit because probable 
cause grounded the arrest and prosecution.  “‘[G]overnment 
officials performing discretionary functions, generally are 
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”’  Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483 (quoting Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 8  Since the District 
                                              
8 ‘“A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue 
must consider, then, this threshold question:  Taken in the 
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the 
facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a 
constitutional right?  This must be the initial inquiry.  If no 
constitutional right would have been violated were the 
allegations established, there is no necessity for further 
inquiries concerning qualified immunity.  On the other hand, 
if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the 
parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask 
whether the right was clearly established.’”  Wright v. City of 
Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 600 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).). 
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Court decided that no constitutional violation occurred, we 
examine this first. 
 
B. 
 The District Court correctly ascertained that, since 
false arrest and malicious prosecution hinge on probable 
cause, the constitutional violation question in this case turns 
on whether “‘a reasonable officer could have believed that 
probable cause existed’ to arrest” the plaintiff at that time.  
Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, 504 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 
2007) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228-29 
(1991)).  Moreover, because Sciulli arrested Andrews on a 
valid warrant, the District Court properly focused its probable 
cause analysis on whether Sciulli ‘“knowingly and 
deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made 
false statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood in 
applying for a warrant.’”  Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 
396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997)).  Therefore, we must concentrate on 
two elements:  first, whether “the officer, with at least a 
reckless disregard for the truth, ‘made false statements or 
omissions that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a 
warrant,’ and second, whether those assertions or omissions 
were ‘material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.  
[Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 780, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000)] 
(quoting Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399).’”  Dempsey v. Bucknell 
Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 468–69 (3d Cir. 2016).  
However, as we recently acknowledged, a certain 
tension exists when probable cause is at issue in a motion for 
summary judgment.  Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 468.  This is 
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particularly so for analyses that center upon 
misrepresentations and omissions in the affidavit of probable 
cause.  Although a finding of probable cause generally can be 
based on an officer’s credibility determinations and 
independent assessments of conflicting evidence, “it is 
axiomatic that at the summary judgment stage, we view the 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  
Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 468.  As a result:  
 
[We cannot] exclude from the 
probable cause analysis 
unfavorable facts an officer 
otherwise would have been able 
to consider.  Instead, we view all 
such facts and assess whether any 
reasonable jury could conclude 
that those facts, considered in 
their totality in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, 
did not demonstrate a “fair 
probability” that a crime occurred. 
 
Id.  For these reasons we rely on our general rule that an 
assertion “is made with reckless disregard when ‘viewing all 
the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts 
as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to 
doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.’”  Wilson, 
212 F.3d at 788 (quoting United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 
801 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1995)).  Misleading assertions can relate to 
even “minor details,” and do not need a separate 
determination of relevance.  The focus in these instances is 
upon evidence demonstrating that the affiant willingly and 
“affirmatively distort[ed] the truth.”  Id. at 788.  Omissions 
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are made with reckless disregard where “an officer withholds 
a fact in his ken that ‘[a]ny reasonable person would have 
known . . . was the kind of thing the judge would wish to 
know.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 
1235 (8th Cir.1993)). 
 
C. 
 The District Court found an omission in the affidavit 
Sciulli prepared.  It concluded that Sciulli was aware that 
Wagner reported a partial license plate–ACG—on the day of 
the incident, but omitted it from his affidavit.  It ruled that a 
reasonable person would know that a judge would want to see 
this in the probable cause affidavit. 
 
 The District Court was also convinced that Sciulli 
willfully made a number of false or misleading assertions.  
Specifically, Sciulli falsely represented Wagner’s description 
of the perpetrator as a “middle aged white male with dark hair 
with streaks of gray.”  Appx. 245.  The police incident report 
Sciulli prepared indicates she said that the man was “about 35 
years old,” with “dark hair.”  Appx. 130.  The District Court 
noted that Sciulli’s averments more closely aligned with 
Andrews’ driver’s license photo, and concluded from this that 
Sciulli’s actions went beyond carelessness or simple 
negligence.  These were affirmative assertions of misleading 
information. 
 
 Next, the District Court was convinced that, due to the 
license plate differences, Sciulli had an “obvious reason” to 
doubt that his assertion that Wagner spotted the “same 
vehicle” the day after the incident.  Andrews, 2015 WL 
5732101, at *6.  Similarly, it concluded Sciulli’s statement 
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that Wagner positively identified Andrews “again” was 
inaccurate because it overstated her confidence in the 
identification.  None of these conclusions by the District 
Court are at issue in this appeal.9 
 
 We are convinced, however, that the District Court 
erred by failing to identify an additional omission.  In spite of 
ruling that Sciulli’s reference to the “same vehicle” was a 
misleading assertion, the District Court concluded that the 
record did not provide any evidence that the officer knew 
there were differences between Andrews’ car and the 
perpetrator’s car.  This is error. 10  Sciulli affirmed that, after 
speaking with Wagner and her mother on November 26, 2012 
about the location of Andrews’ car, he went to look at the 
                                              
9 Andrews claims that the District Court erred by failing to 
rule on the impact of Sciulli’s words to Wagner as he 
presented the photo array to her.  However, Sciulli included 
what he said to Wagner in the affidavit.  Appx. 245.  
Therefore, Sciulli neither omitted or misrepresented these 
words.  Andrews also takes issue with certain remarks Sciulli 
made after Wagner selected his photo.  But, the District Court 
properly ruled that this was irrelevant to Wagner’s decision 
because it occurred after she selected a photograph. 
 
10 We presume that, if the District Court had reconstructed the 
affidavit, it would have corrected the affidavit by changing 
“this same vehicle” to “a vehicle.”  In light of this, to be 
consistent with the District Court’s findings, we treat the 
details about Andrews’ car separately as an omission from the 
affidavit, rather than a misrepresentation. 
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vehicle.  He was aware, at that time, that the car was not a 
four-door sedan. 
 
Q.  Did you make any 
effort to go to the Axiom 
parking lot to observe the 
vehicle that Ms. Wagner or 
[her mother] said was there 
when they observed it on 
November 26, 2012? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
Q.  Okay, when did you go 
to that parking lot? 
 
A.  I can’t recall an exact 
time.  It would have been 
after speaking with them. 
 
Q.  When you saw that 
vehicle, you knew that it 
was not a four door, 
correct? 
 
A. Yes. 
 
Appx. 151-52.  Sciulli expressed uncertainty about the time, 
not the date, that he went to the parking lot.  Moreover, he 
admitted knowing that Andrews’ car was different from 
Wagner’s description.  This is clear evidence that, at some 
point on November 26, 2012, Sciulli knew that Andrews’ car 
was different from the car Wagner described the previous 
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day.11  Sciulli equivocates only on whether he had this 
knowledge before he wrote the affidavit.  Appx. 152.  But, 
there is no dispute that Sciulli signed and swore to the 
truthfulness of his affidavit on November 28, 2012.  Appx. 
245.  This is significant. 
 
 When an officer submits a sworn affidavit of probable 
cause, he or she “is not free to disregard plainly exculpatory 
evidence, even if substantial inculpatory evidence (standing 
by itself) suggests that probable cause exists.”  Dempsey, 834 
F.3d at 469 (quoting Wilson, 212 F.3d at 790).  Therefore, 
even if Sciulli drafted the affidavit on November 26, 2012, 
before going to the parking lot, he, at the very least, had good 
reason to doubt, on November 28, 2012, the truthfulness of 
his affidavit that falsely stated Andrews’ car was the same red 
four-door sedan that Wagner described on the day of the 
incident.  Consistent with the District Court’s ruling on the 
license plate number, we are confident that this omission 
regarding the discrepancy in the number of doors on the cars 
is something that “any reasonable person would know that a 
judge would want to know.”  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 783.  
 
D. 
 The District Court’s analysis focused on the omitted 
license plate number and the overstatement of confidence 
attached to Wagner’s positive identification of Andrews.  But, 
                                              
11Even if we were to read this portion of the record as 
ambiguous, Andrews is entitled to a favorable, reasonable 
inference at summary judgment that Sciulli possessed this 
knowledge on November 26, 2012. 
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it did not present a reconstructed affidavit that corrects 
misleading assertions and includes omitted evidence.  The 
memorandum opinion was filed roughly eleven months 
before we clarified our requirement that courts “perform a 
word-by-word reconstruction of the affidavit” to ensure that 
all relevant evidence known to the police officer at the time is 
considered in the materiality analysis.  Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 
470.  Therefore, particularly since we have concluded that 
there is an additional omission, we will—in the interest of 
judicial economy—reconstruct the affidavit, rather than 
require it to be done on remand.  Id. at 475.  It reads as 
follows: 
 
Officers were notified on 
11/25/12 at approximately 1112 
hours, of a possible child luring 
incident.  I, officer Sciulli, and 
officer Ruiz were dispatched to 
1309 Island Avenue to meet the 
victim.  At this time, officers 
spoke with the victim.  The 
female juvenile's information was 
obtained and is on  record and 
said juvenile and parent will be 
present at all court hearings. 
 
The victim (female juvenile age 
15) stated that while walking 
home from a friend's house, a red 
vehicle with four doors pulled up 
next to her while walking on the 
sidewalk and asked her (juvenile 
age 15) if she wanted a ride.  The 
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victim stated “NO”.  The 
defendant then said “COME ON, 
JUST GET IN”.  The victim then 
said “NO, I’M FINE.  Now I am 
going to report you.” The victim 
then stated that the vehicle sped 
away. 
 
The victim then described this 
male as a middle aged white  
male with dark hair with streaks 
of gray [about 35 years old].  
Victim described the vehicle as a 
red 4 door sedan.  [She identified 
a partial license plate as ACG, 
PA tag.] 
 
On 11/26/12, the victim spotted 
this same vehicle described 
above [a vehicle, a red three-
door coupe], driving on Island 
Avenue, while riding with her 
mother.  She identified the plate 
as JDG4817, PA tag.  They 
followed the vehicle to Axion, 
and victim again positively 
identified the male driver as the 
suspect she encountered the 
previous day. 
 
The victim and her mother came 
to the station to give officers this 
information.  Officers ran the PA 
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plate, JDG4817, and found it to be 
registered to David Gene 
Andrews, out of Beaver Falls, PA.  
Based on this information, 
officers created a line up using 
similar identifiers as Andrews. 
 
The victim was shown a line up, 
created by myself and officer 
Gruber, generated by descriptors 
through J-NET[sic].  The victim 
was asked to look at the pictures 
and to see if there was anyone of 
the pictures that she recognized as 
the driver of the car.  She was 
advised that he might or might not 
be in the pictures.  The victim 
looked at the pictures and almost 
immediately picked out the 
picture of defendant.  The 
defendant was identified through 
JNET Pa. drivers [sic] license as 
David Gene Andrews, DOB 
[REDACTED]. 
 
Your affiant respectfully requests 
that a warrant be issued for David 
Gene Andrews based on the facts 
enumerated above. 
 
E. 
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To affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment, we must conclude that “no reasonable jury could 
find facts that would lead to the conclusion” that the 
reconstructed affidavit “lacked probable cause.”  Wilson, 212 
F.3d at 792.  When the District Court ruled that the omissions 
and misleading assertions it found were not material to 
probable cause, it did so convinced that there were no 
substantial distinctions between the facts in Wilson and in this 
case.  Although we ultimately conclude that Wilson is 
distinguished, it does provide a useful point of reference in 
our analysis of this case. 
 
In Wilson, a police officer (Darrin Russo) claimed that 
probable cause for a warrant existed because an eyewitness 
(the owner of a floral shop that was robbed) positively 
identified Franklin Wilson from a photo array.  Id. at 785.  
Russo excluded  some exculpatory evidence.12  We decided 
                                              
12 (1)  Russo did not inform the court that the shop owner 
(whose height was around 5ˊ6˝) estimated the robber’s height 
on the day of the crime to be between 6ˊ2˝ and 6ˊ4˝; but, the 
man she identified three days later in a photo lineup, Wilson, 
was only 5ˊ11˝.  Id. at 785.  (2)  Russo did not mention to the 
court that the floral shop employee looked at the same photo 
array and did not identify anyone.  (The floral shop employee 
estimated that the robber was 6ˊ5˝tall.)  Id.  (3)  Russo did not 
inform the court that a dental office employee, who linked the 
others’ physical descriptions of the robber to Wilson, saw him 
at a time that contradicted the account given by the two in the 
floral shop.  The dental office employee saw Wilson in the 
shopping center around 3:30 PM; but, the shop owner and 
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that the exculpatory evidence Russo left out did not fatally 
undermine the eyewitness’ positive identification and 
concluded that “[w]hen a police officer has received a reliable 
identification by a victim of his or her attacker, the police 
have probable cause.”  Id. at 791 (quoting Sharrar v. Felsing, 
128 F.3d 810, 818-19 (3d Cir. 1997)).13  Nonetheless, 
stressing that probable cause requires an individualized 
analysis, we also said that “[i]ndependent exculpatory 
evidence or substantial evidence of the witness’s own 
unreliability that is known by the arresting officers could 
outweigh the identification such that probable cause would 
not exist.”  Id. at 790.  Therefore, since the District Court’s 
probable cause ruling in this case rests squarely on Wagner’s 
positive identification of Andrews, our materiality review 
centers on whether any of the misleading assertions and 
omitted facts that we corrected in our reconstructed affidavit 
could outweigh this identification, or undermine reliance on 
it. 
 
F. 
                                                                                                     
shop employee said the robber was in their store from 3:00 
PM to 3:50 PM.  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 784-85. 
 
13 Probable cause to arrest “exists whenever reasonably 
trustworthy information or circumstances within a police 
officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of 
reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been 
committed by the person being arrested.”  United States v. 
Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir.2002). 
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 The first changes to the affidavit concern Wagner’s 
physical description of the perpetrator from the day of the 
incident.  Sciulli misrepresented the description by, as the 
District Court noted, making it hue closer to the image of 
Andrews’ driver’s license photo.  The reconstructed affidavit 
reads as follows: 
 
The victim then described this 
male as a middle aged white male 
with dark hair with streaks of 
gray [about 35 years old].  
  
We agree with the District Court’s application of Wilson to 
these misleading assertions; standing alone, they would not be 
material to probable cause. 
 
 In Wilson, the police officer did not inform the court 
that the shop owner estimated the robber’s height on the day 
of the crime to be between 6ˊ2˝ and 6ˊ4˝; but, the man she 
identified three days later in a photo lineup (Wilson), was 
only 5ˊ11˝.  Id. at 785.  We ruled that “this indication of 
unreliability does not, from the vantage point of the arresting 
officer, fatally undermine the forceful positive identification.”  
Id. at 791.   
 
 We elaborated, however, that different facts could 
produce different results.  We posed the example of an officer 
who is aware that a witness described the robber as 7ˊ tall, but 
selected a person in a photo lineup who is actually 5ˊ tall.  
This “substantial evidence of the witness's own unreliability” 
could change the probable cause analysis.  Id. at 790.  We 
also gave a scenario in which an officer knows about reliable, 
independent, exculpatory DNA evidence that contradicts a 
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positive identification.  In such a case “the positive 
identification would not be enough” to outweigh such 
evidence.  Id.  These examples were, of course, illustrative of 
a common sense approach to the materiality analysis; they are 
not bright-line rules.  See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 
(1983) (“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the 
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not 
readily, or even usually, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”); 
see also Goodwin v. Conway, 836 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 
2016) (Probable cause analysis uses a “common sense 
approach” to issues grounded in a totality of the 
circumstances.).  Nonetheless, we can safely extract from 
them a general principle that glaring discrepancies in a 
witness’ testimony can undermine the reliability of an 
eyewitness who provides a positive identification.14  The 
                                              
14We regard “glaring differences” as those that would be , by 
the lights of any reasonable person in the same circumstances, 
significant because they fall well outside common-sense 
margins of error that typically apply to witness’ subjective 
observations involving estimation and approximation.  These 
types of discrepancies are not easily or reasonably reconciled.  
Compare Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975) 
(Probable cause analysis “does not require the fine resolution 
of conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt or even a 
preponderance standard demands.”(emphasis added)); and, 
Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 481 (Witness estimates of time are 
notoriously unreliable.); and, Peet v. City of Detroit, 502 F.3d 
557, 564 (6th Cir. 2007) (The “differences are minor and are 
of the sort to be expected when different eye witnesses 
recollect the same event.”); with, Robinson v. Winslow Twp., 
973 F. Supp. 461, 471 (D.N.J. 1997) (“A reasonable jury 
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same is true when our review uncovers highly reliable, 
independent, exculpatory evidence known by the officer. 
 
Applying this understanding to the facts in question 
here, Sciulli’s misrepresentation of Wagner’s description of 
the perpetrator’s age and hair, on its own,  does not outweigh 
or undermine her positive identification.  Although Sciulli’s 
misrepresentations did make Wagner’s description of the 
perpetrator seem more like Andrews, correcting “middle 
aged” to read “about 35,” and deleting a reference to a 
“streaks of gray” in the perpetrator’s hair are, by our lights, 
trivial differences that would not impact a reasonable jury’s 
conclusions about probable cause.  Sciulli’s misrepresentation 
made his description of the perpetrator’s age inaccurate and 
more vague.   But, as with the height difference in Wilson, an 
estimate of age is inherently grounded in a subjective 
approximation that allows for reasonable margins of error.  
Here, even after making appropriate corrections, we regard 
the difference between “about 35” and Andrews’ actual age at 
                                                                                                     
could conclude that although eyewitness descriptions are not 
always accurate, the police should have known that the 
eyewitnesses simply could not have described a 5ˊ4˝ man as 
being six foot tall.”); and, Mendez v. Artuz, 303 F.3d 411, 415 
(2d Cir. 2002) (In the context of a habeas corpus case, where 
testimony described the shooter as between 5ˊ4˝ and 5ˊ8˝ and 
130 pounds and the height and weight of the suspect was 
6ˊ2˝and 190 pounds, the court said:  “[t]he contradictory 
eyewitness testimony about the shooter’s height and weight . . 
. gives us pause. . . .These discrepancies are significant and 
troubling.”). 
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that time (51) as difficult to visualize or estimate in any 
precise way, falling within a margin of error that is expected 
with approximations of this type.  Therefore, this misleading 
assertion did not obscure a discrepancy that is meaningful 
enough, by itself, to create doubt about the credibility of the 
witness.15  For these reasons, we conclude that Sciulli’s 
misrepresentation, standing alone, would not be material to 
the determination of probable cause here.  Similarly, Sciulli’s 
misrepresentation of Wagner’s description of the 
perpetrator’s hair (adding the detail of “streaks of gray”) was 
also undeniably inaccurate, and made the description sound 
closer to Andrews’ hair color.  Nonetheless, Wagner’s more 
general reference to “dark hair” is still inculpatory (albeit less 
strong), given that Andrews had black hair, and would not,  
by itself, be material to probable cause.   
 
In summary, we conclude that this collection of 
misrepresentations in Sciulli's affidavit concerning the 
physical description of Andrews, standing alone, would not 
be sufficient to prevent a fact-finder from concluding that the 
reconstructed affidavit still established probable cause.16 
                                              
15 Like Wilson, our assessment of the materiality of the age 
discrepancy might be different if Andrews was 80 (or perhaps 
16) years old:  situations in which a mere error of 
approximation would not reasonably explain the gap. 
  
16 Of course, we must consider whether misrepresentations 
and reckless omissions, “considered in the context of the 
affidavit as a whole were . . . material, or necessary, to the 
finding of probable cause.”  Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 477.  Thus, 
there may be instances when no single omission or 
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G. 
 We turn, next, to the portion of the reconstructed 
affidavit dealing with cars that Wagner linked to the crime.  
We made the following corrections. 
 
Victim described the vehicle as a 
red 4 door sedan.  [She identified 
a partial license plate as ACG, 
PA tag.] 
 
On 11/26/12, the victim spotted 
this same vehicle described 
above [a vehicle, a red three-
                                                                                                     
misrepresentation is sufficient to defeat a finding of probable 
cause, but the combined effect of the omissions and 
misrepresentations suffices to call into question the reliability 
of the affiant and the affiant’s witnesses such that the 
question of probable cause cannot be resolved on a summary 
judgment motion.  We analyze here the misrepresentations in 
Sciulli’s affidavit concerning Wagner’s identification of 
Andrews to make clear that the discrepancies concerning 
Andrews’ physical characteristics would not, standing alone, 
preclude a finding of probable cause.  Of course, these are not 
the only misrepresentations that we have found.  At a trial, the 
jury will be able to consider the reconstructed affidavit as a 
whole to make the ultimate determination as to whether a 
neutral magistrate, weighing both the inculpatory and 
exculpatory information in the reconstructed affidavit, would 
have found probable cause when presented with a properly 
drawn affidavit. 
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door coupe], driving on Island 
Avenue, while riding with her 
mother. 
 
We agree with the District Court that Sciulli’s assertion that 
Andrews’ car was the “same vehicle” conveyed a higher 
degree of confidence in Wagner’s positive identification than 
was due.  Its materiality to probable cause, however, is best 
understood in the context of the omissions that accompany it.  
Therefore, we now turn to those.  
 
 Sciulli’s affidavit hid from the magisterial district 
judge the partial license plate number on the car Wagner 
described immediately after the crime.  It also did not disclose 
that Andrews’ car was a three-door coupe.  These details 
plainly distinguish Andrews’ car from Wagner’s initial 
description.  Unlike Wagner’s age estimate, these are 
irreconcilable differences that are not easily or reasonably 
explained.  Importantly, Sciulli does not dispute this.  He 
argues only that he did not have timely knowledge of the 
differences.  All of this gives weight to the conclusion that 
these discrepancies are “substantial evidence of the witness’s 
own unreliability” sufficient to outweigh her positive 
identification of Andrews.  Id. at 791.  However, there is one 
additional aspect of this case that is decisive on this issue for 
us.  We can explain it most easily by focusing on a portion of 
our decision in Wilson that, thus far, has not been discussed. 
 
 In Wilson, three witnesses contributed information that 
led to the decision by police to put Wilson’s image in a photo 
array.  A floral shop owner and employee (eyewitnesses to 
the crime) gave physical descriptions of the robber, but 
neither of them knew anything about the robber’s identity.  
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The third witness—a woman who worked nearby in a dental 
office—was not an eyewitness to the crime.  But, upon 
hearing the descriptions from the floral shop owner and 
employee, she aided police by linking these to Wilson (who 
was a dental patient), giving police his name, and indicating 
that he was in the area around the time of the robbery.  Police 
were then able to obtain Wilson’s picture, put it in a photo 
array, and ask the floral shop owner and the floral shop 
employee to look at it.  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 784-85. 
 
 In light of all of this, we ruled that the positive 
identification was reliable evidence of probable cause, in part, 
because:  “[a]dded to this identification is the fact that 
[another witness] testified that she saw Wilson in the vicinity 
near the time of the theft.”  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 791.  It 
mattered that the floral shop owner’s positive identification 
lined up with the judgment of an unrelated witness that 
Wilson was the robber.  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 791; see also 
Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 479 (corroborating testimony factored 
into our conclusion that the corrected affidavit showed 
probable cause). 
 
 Here, unlike Wilson, all evidentiary roads lead back to 
one person.  Wagner was the only one who gave a description 
of the perpetrator and car to police on the day of the crime.  
She also was the only one who implicated Andrews by giving 
police his license number after seeing his car the next day.  
This license number was the sole impetus for police to 
compile a photo array using the image of Andrews from 
which the positive identification was made.  There are no 
other points of reference for Wagner’s positive identification. 
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 A lack of independent corroboration, alone, is not 
necessarily fatal to the reliability of a positive identification 
grounding probable cause in any given case.  However, 
having only one witness as the source of information about a 
crime and perpetrator does, logically, cast a brighter light on 
the body of evidence she or he provides.  In such cases, the 
significance of any consistency or discrepancy in the witness’ 
evidence is enhanced because these are the only indicia of the 
witness’ reliability that are available.  See United States v. 
Singleton, 702 F.2d 1159, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[I]f we are 
to rely upon the certainty of the witnesses, it is crucial to keep 
in mind that the witnesses were also positive about a number 
of aspects of their testimony that directly conflict with their 
identifications.”). 
 
 The discrepancy here does not focus on a physical 
characteristic of the alleged perpetrator, but rather on the car 
that he drove.  Yet, details about the car are central to 
Wagner’s account of the crime.  As we already noted, the 
analysis of probable cause is driven by common sense, 
requiring that we review the totality of the circumstances.  
Goodwin, 836 F.3d at 327.  From this perspective, the 
differences between the vehicle Wagner described on the day 
of the crime and Andrews’ car cannot be easily or reasonably 
explained or reconciled by the facts in the reconstructed 
affidavit.   
 
 All of this, inexorably, leads to the conclusion that 
Wagner must have been, either, mistaken about her 
observation of the car on the day of the crime; or, mistaken 
one day later, when she identified Andrews’ car.  This 
substantial contradiction—combined with the lack of 
independent corroboration of any aspect of the crime—
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convinces us that Sciulli’s omissions and misleading assertion 
are material to probable cause because they hid from the 
magisterial district judge a discrepancy that potentially 
undermines the sole witness’ reliability.  Accordingly, we do 
conclude that the reconstructed affidavit shows substantial 
evidence of the witness’ own unreliability that could 
outweigh Wagner’s positive identification.  This question 
must be resolved by the fact finder.  See Lupyan v. Corinthian 
Colleges Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 322 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).  
Therefore, it was error for the District Court to rule that “no 
reasonable jury could find facts that would lead to the 
conclusion that . . . [the reconstructed affidavit] lacked 
probable cause.”  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 792.17 
                                              
17 The reconstructed affidavit also states the following. 
 
They followed the vehicle to 
Axion, and victim again 
positively identified the male 
driver as the suspect she 
encountered the previous day. 
 
This is unquestionably misleading.  Wagner gave police only 
a description of the physical characteristics of the perpetrator 
on the day of the incident.  Therefore, when she watched 
Andrews get out of his car in the parking the next day, she 
was not positively identifying him “again.”  As the District 
Court ruled, the assertion overstates the confidence of 
Wagner’s observations.  Nonetheless, we conclude that, by 
itself, this misleading assertion would not materially impact a 
fact-finder’s analysis of probable cause.   
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H. 
 This leaves us with the question of whether the rights 
at issue were clearly established at the time.18  We need not 
dwell on this.  “[T]here is no question that . . . the right to be 
free from arrest except on probable cause, was clearly 
established” at the time of Andrews’ arrest.  Orsatti, 71 F.3d 
at 483.  Similarly, the right to be free from prosecutions on 
criminal charges that lack probable cause was also known and 
clearly established at the time that Sciulli prepared his 
affidavit.  See Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 380 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Both rights were grounded in well-settled law and 
thus, on the record of this case, "it would be clear to a 
reasonable officer that [Sciulli's] conduct was unlawful in the 
situation he confronted."  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 
(2001). 
 
IV. 
                                                                                                     
  
18 The District Court determined in the first stage of the 
analysis that there was no constitutional violation, and did not 
go any further.  Because we reach a different conclusion 
about constitutional violations, we will also rule on the purely 
legal question of whether the law was clearly established, 
rather than instruct the District Court to address it on remand.  
 
 32 
 
 For all of these reasons, we will hold that the District 
Court erred by granting summary judgment to Sciulli on the 
basis of qualified immunity.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
order of the District Court and remand the cause for trial.19 
                                              
19 Sciulli also argues that Andrews waived any Fourteenth 
Amendment due process claim.  But since Andrews states 
that he is not pursuing a Fourteenth Amendment claim, this 
argument is irrelevant.   
